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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COM-
P ANY, a Corporation, 
P"laintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12823 
This proceeding is upon Writ of Review to review 
a decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah, dated 
the 7th day of January, 1972, by which it assessed a motor 
fuel tax against plaintiff for motor fuel exported from the 
State of Utah during the period of January 1, 1968, 
through December 21, 1969. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION 
On January 7, 1972, the Utah State Tax Commission 
made its order assessing a motor fuel excise tax against 
taxpayer and ordered the same to be paid totaling in all 
the sum of $75,376.59, together with interest in the 
amount of $5,252.91 (R. 5, 8, 9). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks a review of the proceedings and for 
an order vacating the judgment assessed against it by the 
State Tax Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the relevant facts necessary 
to determine the above entitled action before the State 
Tax Commission, and the Findings of Fact adopted by 
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the Tax Commission fairly represent the facts of the 
instant matter. A summary of the material facts are as ' 
follows: 
Taxpayer now is and at all times hereinafter men-
tioned, has been a licensed distributor of motor fuel (gaso· 
line) in the State of Utah (R. 1, 2). 
During the period of January 1, 1968, through De· 
cember 21, 1969, taxpayer failed to report gallonage of 
motor fuel exported from Utah on line 8 of monthly re· 
ports filed with the State of Utah on Form TC-109 Rev., 
and to report an equal amount of tax exempt purchases 
on line 4 of said reports (R. 2, 6). Through an accounting 
inadvertance taxpayer treated such unreported receipts 
from Continental Oil Company as Nevada exchange re· 
ceipts. This same error was made for twenty-four con· 
secutive months (R. 2, 3). The gallonage received on 
exchange from Continental Oil Company at Pioneer Pipe· 
line TermL.1al, North Salt Lake, and transported to var· 
ious bulk plants owned by taxpayer in eastern Nevada , 
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was reported to the Nevada Tax Commission and tax 
paid thereon (R. 2, 3). On July 20, 1970, taxpayer filed 
a supplemental motor fuel tax return reflecting the gal-
lonage thus received and exported (R. 5). 
The Utah State Tax Commission concluded that 
Section 41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requires 
taxpayer to report motor fuel (gasoline) exported from 
Utah within 180 days from the date of exportation or be-
come liable for the excise tax to the full extent as if said 
motor fuel had been sold in the State of Utah (R. 8). 
Taxpayer claims said exports to be exempt under 
Section 41-11-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which reads 
as follows, to-wit: 
"Sec. 41-11-20. Export Sales Exempt. - Said ex-
cise tax shall not apply to sales of motor fuel ac-
tually exported from this state, and on proof of 
actual exportation upon blanks furnished by the 
state tax commission and in accordance with the 
rules and regulations promulgated by it, the state 
tax commission shall, as the case may be, either 
collect no tax or refund the amount of tax paid 
to the person who paid it on his application made 
within 180 days after exportation." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE, SECTION 41-11-20, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
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Plaintiff submits that Section 41-11-20, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, set forth above, is clear and unambiguous 
and provides two alternatives to the Tax Commission in 
the case of tax exempt exports - 1., collect no tax, or 
2., refund tax previously paid upon application for refund 
filed within 180 days from date of export. The 180 day 
limitation patently applies only to claims for refund and 
Defendant is in error in its interpretation of the statute 
that failure to file evidence of export within 180 days 
makes the exemption unavailable. 
With respect to the use of the word "or", we quote 
from 50 American Jurisprudence 267, paragraph 281: 
"In its elementary sense, however, the word 'or' as 
used in a statute, is a disjunctive particle indicat-
ing an alternative. It often connects a series of 
words or propositions, presenting a choice of either. ' 
If the disjunctive conjunction 'or' is used, the var-
ious members of the sentence are to be taken sepa-
rately." 
And quoting from the Utah Supreme Court in Ring-
wood v. State, 8 U. 2d 287, 289, 333 P. 2d 943 (1959): 
" ... Focusing attention upon the words purporting 
to give the right of revocation, it is to be noted 
that the driver is deemed to give his consent to 
a chemical test of '* * * his breath, blood, 
urine or saliva * * * '. The words being used 
in series, the only connective being the disjunctive 
'or' it applies to the whole series. Therefore the 
ordinary and usual meaning of the language would 
be that the subject is deemed to give his consent 
to a test of some one of the designated substances, 
... 
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or of another, but not all of them. That is, of his 
breath, or of his blood, or of his urine or of his 
ali ' s va." 
Quoting from Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 107 Utah 
502, 155 P. 2d 184, 185 (1945): 
"We therefore address ourselves to its meaning, 
keeping in mind one of the cardinal rules of statu-
tory construction, viz., that the interpretation 
must be based on the language used, and that the 
court has no power to rewrite a statute to make 
it conform to an intention not expressed. 'The leg-
islative intent being plainly expressed, so that the 
act read by itself, or in connection with other stat-
utes pertaining to the same subject, is clear, cer-
tain and unambiguous, the courts have only the 
simple and obvious duty to enforce the law accord-
ing to its terms. * * * If a legislative enact-
ment violates no constitutional provision or princi-
ple, it must be deemed its own sufficient and con-
clusive evidence of the justice, propriety and pol-
icy of its passage.' 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory 
Construction (2nd Ed.) p. 701." 
Here plaintiff has paid no tax on the exports in ques-
tion in Utah but reported the same to the Nevada Tax 
Commission and paid a tax thereon. Plaintiff has, albeit 
belatedly, filed with the Defendant Commission proof of 
export upon blanks furnished by the state tax commission 
and the State of Utah has suffered no damage thereby. 
The State of Utah, under the circumstances of the instant 
matter, should not be allowed to unjustly enrich itself. 
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POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT'S TAX REGULATION 
NO. 3 DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
BASIS FOR THE ASSESSMENT. 
Section 41-11-16 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
provides that the Tax Commission shall administer the 
motor fuels (gasoline) tax law and gives the Commission 
the power to make and promulgate such reasonable rules 
and regulations pertaining to the administration and en-
forcement of the law as the Commission deems necessary. 
Under the powers so granted, the Defendant Tax Com-
mission has adopted various rules pertaining to the ad-
ministration of the motor fuels tax law. Rule No. 3 per-
tains to exports. Such rule is quoted in Findings of Fact 
(R. 6, 7, 8) and, for the convenience of the Court, is 
quoted here: 
"Sales of motor fuel, as defined in the motor fuels 
(gasoline) tax law (chapter 11, title 41, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended), made by a licensed 
distributor in the State of Utah, and actually ex-
ported from the state, will be allowed as exempt 
sales provided the sale and delivery of the motor 
fuel meets with one of the following requirements: 
1. 
2. 
Delivery is made to a point outside the 
State of Utah by a common or contract 
carrier for a licensed distributor in the 
State of Utah; 
Delivery is made to a point outside the 
State of Utah in a vehicle owned and 
operated by a licensed distributor in the 
State of Utah; 
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3. Delivery is made at a point in the State 
of Utah to a licensed distributor or im-
porter of another state for use or sale in 
that state; 
4. Delivery is made, in a drum or similar 
container, at a point in the State of Utah 
to a person for use in another state. 
Each export sale must be supported by records 
that will show the following information: 
In the case of a licensed distributor, records shall 
show date of exportation, consignee or purchaser 
and destination of motor fuel. In cases wherein 
the exporter is not a licensed distributor, credit 
must be claimed through a licensed distributor and 
the following requirements must be met: 
A. Exporter must furnish Form TC-112 
'Proof of Exportation - Motor Fuel' 
showing date of exportation, purchaser or 
consignee and destination of motor fuel. 
B. Licensed distributor shall then make note 
of the date this information is furnished 
and shall make claim for credit due on 
the motor fuel return for the same period 
in which the TC-112 'Proof of Exporta-
tion-Motor Fuel' was received. 
In all cases, claims for credit or refund must be 
made within 180 days from date of export, whether 
claim is made through a licensed distributor or 
directly to the State Tax Commission. All persons 
authorized to do so must file claim directly to the 
State Tax Commission. 
Motor fuel delivered into the fuel tank or auxiliary 
fuel tanks of any vehicle owned and/or operated 
by a resident of this state or any other state is held 
to be taxable." (Emphasis is supplied.) 
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That Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein has 
been, a licensed distributor of motor fuel in the State of 
Utah is admitted. In the case of distributors licensed in 
Utah, exports from Utah are reported on Form TC-110 
D-1. Form TC-110 D-1 is not even mentioned in the Reg. 
ulation No. 3 quoted above and creates an ambiguity and 
uncertainty with respect to a licensed exporter exporting 
gas for his OWJ1 account. The deliveries of motor fuel 
which are the subject of Defendant's assessment were 
made by common carrier truck transport from the Pioneer 
Pipeline Terminal in North Salt Lake to Plaintiff's bulk 
plants located in Eastern Nevada and fall squarely within 
the requirements outlined in sub-paragraph 1. of Regula· 
tion No. 3. 
Plaintiff's records showed the date of exportation, 
the consignee or purchaser and the destination of the 
motor fuel exported. Again, falling squarely within the 
requirements of Regulation No. 3. 
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And in the penultm/ate paragraph of Regulation No. 
3 the requirement, " ... claims for credit or refund must 
be made within 180 days from date of export, ... " 
In our argument under Point I we outline our reason· 
ing tending to support our contention that the Statute 
provides for a 180 day limitation only in cases where there 
is a claim for refund. 
Plaintiff submits that the Regulation even more 
clearly establishes that the 180 day limitation applies 
only to claims for refund and does not support the Tax 
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Commission's theory that the exemption is lost unless 
exports of motor fuel are reported within 180 days from 
exportation. 
POINT III. 
THE TAX COMMISSION BY ITS INTER-
PRETATION AND APPLICATION OF REG-
ULATION NO. 3 DELETES THE SUBSTAN-
TIVE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 41-11-20, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
Those charged with administering the law should not 
be allowed to avoid a statutory exemption by an unrea-
sonable interpretation thereof, but should be required to 
administer the law in a reasonable manner with a view 
to effectuating the Legislative intent. 
The Tax Commission by its Regulation No. 3 substi-
tutes the words of the statute, "collect no tax" for "claims 
for credit", thus disregarding the substantive portion of 
Section 41-11-20 which provides that there will be no ex-
cise tax collected on motor fuel exported from the State 
and arbitrarily imposes a limitation on the exemption by 
making it unavailable if motor fuel exported from the 
state is not reported to the Tax Commission within 180 
days from exportation. 
In Crystal Car Line, et al. v. State Tax Commission, 
et al., 110 Utah 426, 174 P. 2d 984, 987 (1946), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
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"The power to tax is purely a legislative function 
and unless the legislature has provided for the tax. 
ation of the property any attempt to levy and 
assess a tax on property is void." 
Plaintiff contends that the 180 day limitation sought 
to be imposed by the Tax Commission is completely out. 
side the boundaries established by the Statute and the 
Rule is arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT IV. 
THE ASSESSMENT AS CONSTITUTING A 
PENALTY. 
Chapter 11, Title 41, of the Utah Code Annotated 
1953, wherein the motor fuels (gasoline) tax law is foun4 
provides various penalties for various offenses, but there 
is no penalty provided, as such,, for the late reporting of 
export sales. 
Section 41-11-21 provides that any violation of the 
law not otherwise specifically provided for is a misde· 
meanor and punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor 
more than $1,000 or imprisonment in the county jail for 
not more than 90 days or both. 
By the attempted extinguishment of the exemption 
allowed, the Tax Commission seeks to levy a penalty o! 
100% of the tax involved. This is without legislative 
authority and is clearly arbitrary. 
As a general proposition it is recognized that penal 
statutes should be strictly construed. General Petroleum 
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Corporation of California v. Smith, 157 P. 2 356 (Ariz. 
1945). 
We find no decisions of the Utah Courts on the pre-
cise question but in conjunction with various cases in-
volving forfeitures under property tax laws, the Utah 
Supreme Court has indicated that statutes providing for 
forfeiture of property for non-payment of taxes must be 
construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing 
authority. See Fivas v. Petersen, 5 U. 2d 280, 300 P. 2d 
635 (1956),, and Mecham v. Mel-0-Tone Enterprises, 
Inc., 23 U. 2d 403, 464 P. 2d 392 (1970), and various cases 
cited. 
Plaintiff submits that in the matter at hand, the Tax 
Commission, by denying the exemption provided by Sec. 
41-11-20 Utah Code Annotated 1953, for a late filing of 
a report is imposing a penalty against plaintiff of 100% 
of the tax involved without authority of law and, in so 
doing, is acting arbitrarily and capriciously. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no statute or other basis for the Tax Com-
mission's judgment against taxpayer in the amount of 
$75,376.59 together with interest in the amount of 
$5,252.91. On the contrary, Section 41-11-20, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 and Tax Regulation No. 3 support plain-
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tiff's position that sales of motor fuel made by a licensed 
distributor and actually exported from the state are ex-
empt sales and not subject to tax. 
The relief prayed for by plaintiff should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
-
